North Dakota Law Review
Volume 45

Number 2

Article 1

1968

Introduction
Monrad G. Paulsen

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Paulsen, Monrad G. (1968) "Introduction," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 45 : No. 2 , Article 1.
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol45/iss2/1

This Introduction is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons.
For more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu.

INTRODUCTION
MONRAD

G.

PAULSEN*

Though the institution of the juvenile court dates from the turn
of the century, lawyers, legal scholars and, indeed, legislators (apart
from establishing the court and voting appropriations for it) took
little interest until about a decade ago. The traditional legal norms
for dealing with adult offenders, it was thought, had little to do
with the child protective-child saving mission of a children's court.
This mission was best done by employing a model of wise discretion
informed by parental concern for the young, as opposed to the
rule-governed operations of state officials working under constitutional limitations. Law with its inevitable tendency to treat like
cases alike unless some objective, demonstrable difference can be
discerned, was not regarded as a helpful tool in a program of character building treatment. The ideal of equality before the law seemed
to threaten the making of purely clinical judgments in the interest
of each individual child.
At long last in the late fifties and early sixties more law-trained
persons turned their attention to the juvenile court. The trickle
of scholarly articles became a rushing stream. Juvenile Court
Acts in two major states, California and New York, were reworked
between 1959 and 1962. Both were based on the troubled recognition
that informal juvenile court proceedings were productive of dissatisfaction, if not injustice. Both statutes made provisions for
greater procedural formality in the handling of cases as well as for
additional legislative limitations on the juvenile court's power to
make dispositional orders. For example, New York's statute established a right to counsel, a method of offering paid lawyers to
indigent respondents, a privilege of testimonial silence and new
rules regarding the admissibility of evidence. New York also limited
the duration of a probation order, as well as the length of time a
child might remain in a training school. Lawyers were prominent
among the legislators responsible for the legislation and among
members of citizens' committees assisting the effort.
The courts, state as well as federal (Kent v United States and
In Re Gault are only the two most highly visible opinions) took a
new look at the juvenile court system and imposed procedural
safeguards for youthful respondents not unlike those available for
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persons accused of crime. Finally, the President's Crime Commission, speaking for the executive branch of government, called
for more formality in the hearing of juvenile matters.
Why this insistence on procedural norms?
Surely several factors have played a role. The ideal that the
judge is to perform like a substitute father with loving concern for
an erring son cannot be carried out in the nation's large cities
(if, indeed, it can be done anywhere). A white judge in Chicago,
a well paid law graduate, does not seem like a father to the black
teen-age dropout appearing before the court-nor does the judge feel
as a father to the child. Tension and conflict, not affection, haunt
the hearing in such a case. In the eyes of the respondent, discretionary justice is indistinguishable from acts of discrimination.
A formal hearing might restore the appearance of justice.
The rights of a person accused of crime are valued more highly
today than at the turn of the century. Not many lawyers in 1900
would have seen the privilege against incrimination in the same
light as Mr. Justice Fortas. In Gault the Justice wrote, "The roots
of the privilege . . . top the basic stream of religious and political
principle . . ." The "loopholes" of McKinley's day have become
the indispensable safeguards of liberty today.
The juvenile court has never received the support in resources
which the ideal of saving children required. Judge Friederich's
paper provides us with documentation. He reports the lack of adequate detention, probation and aftercare services. The means predicated as necessary to rehabilitate young offenders have not been
made available. If procedural rights were put aside in order to
facilitate the offering of services, the rights ought to be restored
if services are not forthcoming.
There is a more far reaching point. More and more persons
have come to doubt whether we have at hand the means to "reform"
offenders. The President's Crime Commission Report (p. 80) makes
the point:
But it is by no means true that a simple infusion of
resources into juvenile courts and attendant institutions
would fulfill the expectations that accompanied the court's
birth and development. There are problems that go much
deeper. The failure of the juvenile court to fulfill its rehabilitative and preventive promise stems in important measure
from a grossly overoptimistic view of what is known about
the phenomenon of juvenile criminality and of what even
a fully equipped juvenile court could do about it. Experts in
the field agree that it is extremely difficult to develop successful methods for preventing serious delinquent acts
through rehabilitative programs for the child.
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The point goes deeper. The juvenile court process, far from helping
the youth, may harm him.
Official action may actually help to fix and perpetuate
delinquency in the child through a process in which the individual begins to think of himself as delinquent and organizes
his behavior accordingly.
Such considerations moved the Crime Commission to suggest
that the juvenile court's basic strategy is wrong. We can not significantly reduce the level of crime by hoping to treat and rehabilitate identified offenders. Crime can be reduced to an important
degree only by taking broad measures of social reform: improving
prospects for the employment of youth, expanding educational opportunities, building new housing in better urban environments. The
Commission's basic program is social and not directed to the
individual offender.
The Crime Commission, of course, is aware that something
must be done when a teenager commits a serious violation of law.
The Commission, however, would take the youth to court only reluctantly. It would provide him with services and treatment prior to
court adjudication, if at all possible. The juvenile court thus would
become a court of "last resort" for those teenagers who can not
be reached except by the use of disciplinary authority. The court
would not be a gateway through which a youngster passes to obtain
the services he requires but an instrument of community reassurance, deterrence and rehabilitation if possible.
The papers in this symposium reflect the interests of today.
The execution of the plan for publication in the Law Review is
itself another example of the broad interests which lawyers now
take in the juvenile court field.
Judge Arthur does not write as one who recognizes the legal
rights of children in a grudging fashion. His essay exhibits a desire
to identify what fairness demands of a court which deals with
children. Children, he writes, should not be "as equal as people"
and should not have as much liberty. But some rights they have.
A lawyer is a constitutional necessity and "should advocate that
which his client would seek if his client were mature of thought."
Yet jury is not required, "justice can better come from judges than
juries." Judge Arthur seeks a balance between the necessary protection of children by legal safeguards and those procedural devices
which might stand in the way of treatment opportunities.
Judge Friederich tells of local action aimed at improving the
situation of juveniles in North Dakota. He reprints a portion of a
report undertaken by the Division of Juvenile Delinquency Service
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of the Children's Bureau. The report recommends legal training
for the judicial officers who make decisions about children;
"unofficial" hearings should be discontinued; the statute should define "juvenile delinquency" more narrowly and precisely. These
matters are precisely the kinds of things that reflect the new lawyer's
interest in this field.
One by-product of more lawyers paying attention to juvenile
courts is that the problems arising in the courts are receiving more
detailed analysis. There is less general talk and a bit more attention
to detail. How should a juvenile court judge handle a mentally
disordered youth? Mr. Donovan's piece, admirably, does not answer the question. That question is too simple minded. The real
questions are more detailed. The big issue needs to be broken into
parts such as the problem of incompetency at trial, the problem of
waiving a mentally disordered youth to the criminal court, the
problem of the defense of insanity in a juvenile court case. Mr.
Donovan not only makes distinctions but gets his answers by looking
to the world, by gathering facts not wool. By his method we are
all enlightened.
This symposium again serves to remind us that, while law is
important in juvenile court, in the final analysis the most important
matter is what happens to the youthful respondent. We are not
sure how we can help him but if there is a way we should employ
it. If there are reasonable techniques for treatment we should embrace them. Let us not forget a related point. If we can not help
much, we surely ought not to harm. We should scrutinize our processes and uproot, to the degree practicable, that which degrades,
embarrasses, costs or hurts.
The editors of the Review deserve congratulations for giving the
lawyers of North Dakota this look at the juvenile court. I hope the
lawyers will be moved to give the court and its satellite institutions
the benefit of their wisdom and further, be moved to act for improvement.

